Note: This is a “blog version” of one of my latest papers…
Several issues from the past decades, particularly those that pertain to social justice and human rights, have been highlighted and exposed. These dehumanizing realities magnified the depth of sufferings and injustices endured by millions of people. Such stirred up responses of indignation and protests from the different realms of societies. Social injustices inflicted to human kind during first and second world wars and from the colonization era prompted global efforts aimed to ensure that individuals are protected and their rights as human beings be recognized and uplifted, especially those of the disadvantaged and the oppressed. Universal treaties and organizations were created, and these were supported by nation states coalitions, the United Nations most especially, which purported the creation of different “universalized” pacts and lawful mandates.
The universality of such rights, i.e. human rights as promulgated by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, basically promote the rights of every individual in the world- whereby such rights are perceived as inherent to the very existence of human beings. These abstracted rules are adopted by every government of nation states who signed for the promulgation of the treaty. The “abstractness” of these mandates which were justified as a response to different cultures and social norms, allow for every society to interpret these global social orders in accordance to the acceptable notion and practice within their social circle, and these remain to be questionable to some with regards to its “applicability” and effectiveness in different social settings and practical situations. More so when other unique mandates from different authorities that social actors must perform (i.e. military personnel) would be taken into consideration. Thus, debates in different areas of concern, mostly pertaining to these very laws’ nature of “universality” still continue.
From a certain vantage point that one would opt to view social dynamics within semi-autonomous social fields (according to Sally Falk Moore, such would highlight the existence and interplay of legal pluralism, defined as the existence of a social “condition” created when several social orders occupy a certain social sphere), it would be inevitable that issues on human rights be exposed and magnified. Thus, one would be able to point out several issues of concern. Adapting such method of examination, it appears to me that issues pertaining to the rationality of these universal or “universalized” laws would be essential points of discussion.
Due to the diversity of cultures and normative orders, different moral interpretations (and the inherent ethnocentric nature of the social actors) tend to be applied in various social settings and situations. Such would inevitably result to varying interpretations by different societies and cultures. In this case, it might not be possible to attain a universally acceptable interpretation and/or shared understanding of meaning whereby every culture and socio-ethnic group would accept it as valid and fair. Thus, the complexity of the cultural groundings of such “universal” laws’ may lead to some critical questions as to the rationale and rationality of its “foundational basis”, and quite possibly, questions may arise as to the validity and fairness of its mandates and rulings.
Human rights, in accordance to the UN’s operational definition, which are rights granted to every human being “simply by the virtue of being human,” asserts that there are inherent rights which are fundamentally derived from the very existence of human beings; and such rights constitute certain forms of laws (Woodman 2006:1). Human rights, moreover, are said to be grounded in cross culturally recognized moral values, which, in my understanding, is basically saying that the cultural groundings of such “universalized” mandates should be taken into consideration with regards to fair interpretation and application of these legal mandates. This would correspond to the assertion of most cultural relativists, who support the notion that “value judgments (in connection to universalized laws) should be withheld or suspended until cultural context is taken into account” (Fluehr-Lobban, 1998). It would be from this point that diverse perceptions possibly arise- one of such would concern the existence of a “universally valid human rights”. As Woodman posits, “human societies tends to be so varied that no moral values can be found which are accepted within every human culture, and that therefore no universal values exist” (Woodman 2006). In this regard, the validity and basis of claims to rights in universal laws may be constantly put to some kind of scrutiny, if not to be coupled with cynical criticisms, most likely by different human rights groups from different fields and affiliations.
Another pressing question would be focused on the role, or consideration of, culture in the promulgation of human rights. It is undeniable that opposing concerns between culture and rights has been part of ongoing debates with regards to issues of human rights. Culture, prior understood as more of a “static”, shared systems of beliefs rather than as a process that develops and changes through time (the latter being the more dominant view at present) – may tend to be perceived as a “source of human rights violations” i.e. due to tolerance and/or allowance of violence inflicted on women. Thus, it can be viewed as putting more value on “culture” rather than on “rights”. Thus, as Merry puts it, “the important contemporary questions are not how to resolve the opposition between culture and rights, but how claims to rights and to culture are articulated in global debates about social justice (Merry 2001).
As a personal realization on these concerns, one may add the factors regarding the nature of social dynamics and the “fluidity” of societies as well as the existence of validly recognized normative orders, as point of consideration. Validity of legal orders must correspond to its “reliability”, which means that such mandates still cater to “up-to-date” situations, that societies still interpret it the same way as before (in accordance to changes in meanings associated to social factors,) and that the context in which these laws’ has been basically grounded upon still depict the same or similar social practice and sense of understanding. This is essential because interpretations of such mandates on the level of the subordinated social actors/factors play a very important role in the assessments of its effectiveness. Thus, the abstractness of lawful mandates may constitute polarized or extreme results, whether it is being asserted from an international, national or local sphere of the social world.
Different social situations and conditions whereby “universal mandates” need be implemented is another concern. One has to remember that most of the time; the “oppressors/propagators” of human injustices are not signatories in any universal treaties. Thus, “defenders” of the oppressed and exploited (i.e., the men and women of the Allied Forces fighting against terrorism in the Middle East, or the military people fighting extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines) has the tendency to be subjected to difficult situations whereby human rights mandates include considerations of the “rights as human beings” of the members of groups they are supposed to be fighting with.
In conclusion, there are instances whereby sources of human rights produce polarize and extreme results due to differences of practices, unanticipated consequences, or the conflicting effect of such to one’s culture and tradition. State laws and culture are both resources of normative orders aimed to protect and emancipate human rights. Surprisingly, these very sources of human rights can also exacerbate violations of human rights and social injustices. For instance, state laws can aggravate arbitrary arrests, detention and torture (Fluehr-Lobban 1998), like what happened with the US’ extraordinary case of rendition applied in the Guantamano bay prisoners; while some customary norms may enforce normative practices i.e., forced practice of sati and female circumcision, which certainly cause sufferings and pain to women. In both cases, human sufferings and violations of individual rights certainly breed from exertion of “rights (legal order) and culture (customary practice)”.
Moreover, the changing social meanings which contribute, or supposed to, the fluidity of laws and normative orders posits challenges on the interpretation and thus, may tend to compromise the effectiveness of legal renderings so as to meet the supposed objectives of the universal nature of these global laws- and that is to protect and emancipate human conditions that would ultimately lead towards the abolition of human sufferings and injustices. Thus, in order for us to realize such noble vision, the effectiveness of such rights should be imminently and universally valid and constructed in such a way that it can effectively protect and uphold human rights and social emancipation.
References:
Gordon Woodman 2006. Human Rights: The Route to Judgment or a Diversion?
Sally Engle Merry 2001. Changing Rights, Changing Culture, in Culture and Land Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Jane K. Owen, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Richard Wilson.
Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban 1998. Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights in Anthro Notes, Volume 20, No. 2, Winter, 1998.
Share this Post
COMMENTS
Leofina Jane
Human “Universal” Rights in a Pluralist Society
October 16, 2009 — Leofina JaneNote: This is a “blog version” of one of my latest papers…
Several issues from the past decades, particularly those that pertain to social justice and human rights, have been highlighted and exposed. These dehumanizing realities magnified the depth of sufferings and injustices endured by millions of people. Such stirred up responses of indignation and protests from the different realms of societies. Social injustices inflicted to human kind during first and second world wars and from the colonization era prompted global efforts aimed to ensure that individuals are protected and their rights as human beings be recognized and uplifted, especially those of the disadvantaged and the oppressed. Universal treaties and organizations were created, and these were supported by nation states coalitions, the United Nations most especially, which purported the creation of different “universalized” pacts and lawful mandates.
The universality of such rights, i.e. human rights as promulgated by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, basically promote the rights of every individual in the world- whereby such rights are perceived as inherent to the very existence of human beings. These abstracted rules are adopted by every government of nation states who signed for the promulgation of the treaty. The “abstractness” of these mandates which were justified as a response to different cultures and social norms, allow for every society to interpret these global social orders in accordance to the acceptable notion and practice within their social circle, and these remain to be questionable to some with regards to its “applicability” and effectiveness in different social settings and practical situations. More so when other unique mandates from different authorities that social actors must perform (i.e. military personnel) would be taken into consideration. Thus, debates in different areas of concern, mostly pertaining to these very laws’ nature of “universality” still continue.
From a certain vantage point that one would opt to view social dynamics within semi-autonomous social fields (according to Sally Falk Moore, such would highlight the existence and interplay of legal pluralism, defined as the existence of a social “condition” created when several social orders occupy a certain social sphere), it would be inevitable that issues on human rights be exposed and magnified. Thus, one would be able to point out several issues of concern. Adapting such method of examination, it appears to me that issues pertaining to the rationality of these universal or “universalized” laws would be essential points of discussion.
Due to the diversity of cultures and normative orders, different moral interpretations (and the inherent ethnocentric nature of the social actors) tend to be applied in various social settings and situations. Such would inevitably result to varying interpretations by different societies and cultures. In this case, it might not be possible to attain a universally acceptable interpretation and/or shared understanding of meaning whereby every culture and socio-ethnic group would accept it as valid and fair. Thus, the complexity of the cultural groundings of such “universal” laws’ may lead to some critical questions as to the rationale and rationality of its “foundational basis”, and quite possibly, questions may arise as to the validity and fairness of its mandates and rulings.
Human rights, in accordance to the UN’s operational definition, which are rights granted to every human being “simply by the virtue of being human,” asserts that there are inherent rights which are fundamentally derived from the very existence of human beings; and such rights constitute certain forms of laws (Woodman 2006:1). Human rights, moreover, are said to be grounded in cross culturally recognized moral values, which, in my understanding, is basically saying that the cultural groundings of such “universalized” mandates should be taken into consideration with regards to fair interpretation and application of these legal mandates. This would correspond to the assertion of most cultural relativists, who support the notion that “value judgments (in connection to universalized laws) should be withheld or suspended until cultural context is taken into account” (Fluehr-Lobban, 1998). It would be from this point that diverse perceptions possibly arise- one of such would concern the existence of a “universally valid human rights”. As Woodman posits, “human societies tends to be so varied that no moral values can be found which are accepted within every human culture, and that therefore no universal values exist” (Woodman 2006). In this regard, the validity and basis of claims to rights in universal laws may be constantly put to some kind of scrutiny, if not to be coupled with cynical criticisms, most likely by different human rights groups from different fields and affiliations.
Another pressing question would be focused on the role, or consideration of, culture in the promulgation of human rights. It is undeniable that opposing concerns between culture and rights has been part of ongoing debates with regards to issues of human rights. Culture, prior understood as more of a “static”, shared systems of beliefs rather than as a process that develops and changes through time (the latter being the more dominant view at present) – may tend to be perceived as a “source of human rights violations” i.e. due to tolerance and/or allowance of violence inflicted on women. Thus, it can be viewed as putting more value on “culture” rather than on “rights”. Thus, as Merry puts it, “the important contemporary questions are not how to resolve the opposition between culture and rights, but how claims to rights and to culture are articulated in global debates about social justice (Merry 2001).
As a personal realization on these concerns, one may add the factors regarding the nature of social dynamics and the “fluidity” of societies as well as the existence of validly recognized normative orders, as point of consideration. Validity of legal orders must correspond to its “reliability”, which means that such mandates still cater to “up-to-date” situations, that societies still interpret it the same way as before (in accordance to changes in meanings associated to social factors,) and that the context in which these laws’ has been basically grounded upon still depict the same or similar social practice and sense of understanding. This is essential because interpretations of such mandates on the level of the subordinated social actors/factors play a very important role in the assessments of its effectiveness. Thus, the abstractness of lawful mandates may constitute polarized or extreme results, whether it is being asserted from an international, national or local sphere of the social world.
Different social situations and conditions whereby “universal mandates” need be implemented is another concern. One has to remember that most of the time; the “oppressors/propagators” of human injustices are not signatories in any universal treaties. Thus, “defenders” of the oppressed and exploited (i.e., the men and women of the Allied Forces fighting against terrorism in the Middle East, or the military people fighting extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines) has the tendency to be subjected to difficult situations whereby human rights mandates include considerations of the “rights as human beings” of the members of groups they are supposed to be fighting with.
In conclusion, there are instances whereby sources of human rights produce polarize and extreme results due to differences of practices, unanticipated consequences, or the conflicting effect of such to one’s culture and tradition. State laws and culture are both resources of normative orders aimed to protect and emancipate human rights. Surprisingly, these very sources of human rights can also exacerbate violations of human rights and social injustices. For instance, state laws can aggravate arbitrary arrests, detention and torture (Fluehr-Lobban 1998), like what happened with the US’ extraordinary case of rendition applied in the Guantamano bay prisoners; while some customary norms may enforce normative practices i.e., forced practice of sati and female circumcision, which certainly cause sufferings and pain to women. In both cases, human sufferings and violations of individual rights certainly breed from exertion of “rights (legal order) and culture (customary practice)”.
Moreover, the changing social meanings which contribute, or supposed to, the fluidity of laws and normative orders posits challenges on the interpretation and thus, may tend to compromise the effectiveness of legal renderings so as to meet the supposed objectives of the universal nature of these global laws- and that is to protect and emancipate human conditions that would ultimately lead towards the abolition of human sufferings and injustices. Thus, in order for us to realize such noble vision, the effectiveness of such rights should be imminently and universally valid and constructed in such a way that it can effectively protect and uphold human rights and social emancipation.
References:
Gordon Woodman 2006. Human Rights: The Route to Judgment or a Diversion?
Sally Engle Merry 2001. Changing Rights, Changing Culture, in Culture and Land Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Jane K. Owen, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Richard Wilson.
Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban 1998. Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights in Anthro Notes, Volume 20, No. 2, Winter, 1998.
Share this Post